check
Experiment 1: Results | Environmental Economics and Management

Experiment 1: Results

 
ellsberg paradox
 

Contact Us

The Department of Environmental Economics and Management

The Robert H. Smith Faculty
of Agriculture, Food and Environment
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Herzl 229, Rehovot 7610001
Fax: 08-9466267

Department Head:
Dr. Ohad Raveh, Tel: 08-9489373

Head of the teaching program:
Dr. Ohad Raveh, Tel: 08-9489373

Secretary: 
Miri Arazi, Tel: 08-9489230

Choice Prediction Competition for Decisions under Risk and Ambiguity

CPC 2015 - Supported by the Max Wertheimer Minerva Center
for Cognitive Processing and Human Performance

Organized by: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, and Ori Plonsky

Table 2. The Thirty Problems Studied in Experiment 1.
Click here to download a simpler (and longer) description of the results

                     

B-rate

 

Option A

Option B

Lottery

   

No-FB

With-FB

Prob.

H

pH

L

H

pH

L

Num

Shape

Corr.

Amb

1

2

3

4

5

1

3

1

3

4

0.8

0

1

-

0

0

.42

.57

.57

.60

.65

2

3

0.25

0

4

0.2

0

1

-

0

0

.61

.62

.62

.64

.62

3

-1

1

-1

0

0.5

-2

1

-

0

0

.58

.60

.60

.58

.56

4

1

1

1

2

0.5

0

1

-

0

0

.35

.51

.54

.50

.54

5

-3

1

-3

0

0.2

-4

1

-

0

0

.49

.46

.42

.38

.36

6

0

0.75

-3

0

0.8

-4

1

-

0

0

.38

.40

.40

.42

.41

7

-1

1

-1

0

0.95

-20

1

-

0

0

.48

.63

.62

.62

.64

8

1

1

1

20

0.05

0

1

-

0

0

.39

.38

.33

.34

.29

9

1

1

1

100

0.01

0

1

-

0

0

.47

.40

.39

.39

.39

10

2

1

2

101

0.01

1

1

-

0

0

.55

.45

.43

.42

.42

11

19

1

19

20

0.9

-20

1

-

0

0

.13

.22

.21

.20

.21

12

0

1

0

50

0.5

-50

1

-

0

0

.34

.41

.43

.44

.38

13a

0

1

0

50

0.5

-50

1

-

0

0

.36

.37

.40

.37

.36

14

0

1

0

1

0.5

-1

1

-

0

0

.49

.45

.42

.41

.38

15

7

1

7

50

0.5

1

1

-

0

0

.78

.84

.88

.83

.85

16

7

1

7

50

0.5

-1

1

-

0

0

.71

.79

.81

.83

.83

17

30

1

30

50

0.5

1

1

-

0

0

.24

.33

.33

.30

.29

18

30

1

30

50

0.5

-1

1

-

0

0

.23

.33

.40

.33

.33

19b

9

1

9

9

1

9

8

R-skew

0

0

.37

.39

.36

.31

.30

20

9

1

9

9

1

9

8

R-skew

0

0

.38

.38

.39

.36

.36

21

10

0.5

0

10

0.5

0

1

-

0

1

.37

.42

.47

.48

.51

22

10

0.1

0

10

0.1

0

1

-

0

1

.82

.84

.78

.71

.66

23

10

0.9

0

10

0.9

0

1

-

0

1

.15

.16

.26

.33

.32

24

-2

1

-2

-1

0.5

-3

1

-

0

0

.48

.52

.48

.48

.45

25

2

1

2

3

0.5

1

1

-

0

0

.41

.50

.46

.46

.49

26

16

1

16

50

0.4

1

1

-

0

0

.50

.65

.61

.60

.55

27c

16

1

16

48

0.4

1

3

L-skew

0

0

.50

.57

.60

.58

.57

28

6

0.5

0

9

0.5

0

1

-

-1

0

.91

.87

.83

.85

.84

29

2

1

2

3

1

3

1

-

0

0

.97

.98

.99

.99

1.0

30

6

0.5

0

8

0.5

0

1

-

1

0

.94

.97

.96

.98

.98

 

Note. B-rates are mean choice rates for Option B, presented in five blocks of five trials each: No-FB is the block without feedback, and With-FB are the blocks with feedback. 


a. An accept/reject type problem (the problem is replaced with a proposal to accept or reject a game of chance with Option B’s outcomes). 

b. A coins-toss type problem (Option B is construed as a game of chance similar to that used by Bernoulli, 1738/1954). Its implied payoff distribution is described in Row 6 of Table 1. c The implied payoff distribution is described in Row 10 of Table 1.